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Spin-offs are considered successful founding efforts. The combination of relevant industry specific 
knowledge and direct support from a parent company make these firms stand out from the rest. Spin-offs 
are usually defined on the basis of the previous employment positions of the entrepreneurs. This method 
disregards the process of resource transfer that theoretically explains the differences in performance with 
other foundings. This paper offers an empirical analysis based on the actual resource transfer from parent 
firm to founding. Using the ERC dataset, entrepreneurial skills are used to explain the successful 
conclusion of the founding process. Having skills related to production seems to be beneficial, especially 
when the founding effort also receives support from the parent company. Receiving support as such does 
not render any positive results. Next to the effect of production skills, industry experience adds to the 
explanation of successful founding. It is probable that skills related to market knowledge, being part of a 
network, and reputation enhance chances of pre-entry survival as well.   1 
1. Introduction 
“The numerically dominant group of small businesses are those which are small today and, even 
if they survive, are always likely to remain small-scale operations” (Storey, 1994, p. 112). “We 
know  that  many  start-ups  only  persist  for  a  short  time.  Within  five  years,  about  half  of  all 
initiatives suffer a quiet death. Of the initiatives which do survive, few offer a substantial number 
of jobs” (Schutjens & Wever, 2000, p. 135-136). These statements leave little room for debate; 
exit is immanent for many new firms. And some firms meet this fate rather quickly. A fair share 
of all founding attempts do not even make it to the end of the founding process (Van Gelderen et 
al.,  2003;  Aldrich,  1999).  The  obstacles  and  problems  faced  in  the  founding  process  prove 
insurmountable. 
Little is known about the factors influencing the successful completion of the founding 
process,  or  in  other  words,  the  pre-entry  performance  of  firms.  Literature  on  successful 
entrepreneurship  has  mainly  focussed  on  the  factors  that  influence  post-entry  performance 
indicators, such as employment growth (Hoogstra & Van Dijk, 2004), survival (Nielsen, 2001; 
Shane, 2005), and exit (Eriksson & Kuhn, 2004). Factors influencing pre-entry success remain 
largely hidden. Nevertheless, it is an interesting aspect of entrepreneurship, both from a scientific 
point of view and from a policy perspective. Assessing the pre-entry success fits in the current 
trend of research which focuses on entrepreneurial processes rather than purely on the outcomes 
(see for example Stam, 2003; Pen, 2002). For policy, it is important to know which founding 
efforts are most likely to reach the end of the founding process. Scarce resources can be directed 
to the founding efforts with the highest chance of succeeding. 
In  contrast  to  success  in  the  nascent  stages  of  entrepreneurship,  performance  after 
completing the founding process is well documented. Important factors that explain post-entry 
performance include learning and knowledge creation. Previous research has shown that industry 
experience, the working career, and the general education of entrepreneurs positively influence 
the post-entry performance of new firms (Storey, 1994; Nielsen, 2001; Schutjens & Wever, 2000; 
Dahl  &  Reichstein,  2005).  These  studies  rely  heavily  on  the  assumption  that  a  relevant 
background leads to relevant skills and knowledge to set up a firm. Although this relationship 
cannot be debated, it is theoretically more appropriate to focus on the skills themselves (Koster & 
Van Wissen, 2006). It is not the background that explains performance differences, it is the skills 
of the founders involved. 
  This  paper explores the  factors  explaining the  successful  completion  of  the  founding 
process by nascent entrepreneurs. It draws on existing work about post-entry performance with a 
focus on the influence of learning processes. In doing so, the paper takes an explicit resource-  2 
based  perspective;  the  skills  and  resources  used  by  the  entrepreneurs  determine  pre-entry 
performance,  rather  than  the  background  characteristics  of  the  entrepreneurs.  The  theoretical 
sections  2 and  3  elaborate  upon the relation  between  skills, resources and  founding  success. 
Section  4  introduces  the  ERC  dataset  which  forms  the  basis  for  the  empirical analysis.  The 
comprehensive ERC dataset allows for an empirical analysis that uses the available resources and 
skills directly. Section 5 offers results, section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Resources and skills in the founding process 
Whereas entrepreneurship studies often consider the backgrounds of the entrepreneur rather than 
their  skills  and  abilities,  organisational  studies  do  commonly  focus  on  the  resources  and 
capabilities  of  organisations  (Helfat  &  Lieberman,  2002).  “Resources  include  all  assets, 
capabilities, organizational processes, firm attributes, information, knowledge, etc. controlled by 
the firm that enable the firm to conceive of and implement strategies that improve its efficiency 
and effectiveness” (Barney, 1991, p.101; Daft, 1983). New firm formation can be seen as the 
process of gathering and organising resources for a new firm. The founding process is completed 
when the resources are in place and the new firm is ready for operation. During the gestation 
period, entrepreneurs can use existing resources from other companies. Sometimes, entrepreneurs 
receive direct support from a parent company (Bernardt et al., 2002). It is more common though 
that entrepreneurs use prior experiences to establish the firm (Garvin, 1983). Industry experience 
endows entrepreneurs with the proper skills for competing in the relevant industry (Klepper, 
2001a; Klepper, 2001b; Dahl & Reichstein, 2005; Shane, 2000). In these cases, individual skills 
are transferred to the new firm as human capital. 
 
Human capital 
Becker (1964) gives one of the first comprehensive accounts of human capital. He describes the 
ways in which individuals gather human capital (or skills) and how it influences their productivity 
and earnings. He makes an important distinction between general training and specific training in 
this respect. General training renders skills that are useful outside the firm that provides the 
training (Becker, 1964, p.11). The skills gained can be deployed in every setting. Management 
skills  are  a  clear  example,  but  also  sale  skills  fall  in  this  category.  Transferring  specific 
knowledge is more complex. Specific training has a larger positive effect for the providing firm 
than  for  other  firms  (p.18).  In  other  words,  general  training  results  in  skills  that  are  easily 
deployed in other firms, whereas specific skills lose their merit outside the context of the source 
firm. It is too simplistic, though, to see both types of training as a dichotomy. They form the poles   3 
of a spectrum and most training (and the resulting skills) will be somewhere between the two 
extremes. Becker (1964, p.18) indicates that pure specific training is unlikely to occur, which 
means  that  there  is  often  a  possibility  to  transfer  the  skills  acquired  to  a  different  setting. 
Especially firms that are similar to the source firm can benefit. Following this reasoning, specific 
knowledge is often seen on the scale of the industry. Having a background in an industry renders 
advantages for entrepreneurs that stay active in the same industry (Klepper, 2001a; Agarwal et al., 
2004). 
Departing from Becker’s argument, Brüderl et al. (1992) explicitly address the influence 
of  an  employment  career  on  the  skills  of  entrepreneurs.  They  distinguish  between  industry-
specific  and  entrepreneur-specific  human  capital.  Industry-specific  skills  involve  an 
understanding of the relevant characteristics of a particular industry. The entrepreneur is able to 
identify profitable market niches and with knowledge of production productivity of the firm can 
be  increased.  Industry-specific  knowledge  has  both  a  demand  dimension  and  a  supply  or 
production dimension. Shane (2000; Eckhardt & Shane, 2003) highlights the demand component. 
Experience induces the recognition of possible markets (Shane, 2000 p.259). Although Shane 
sees an obvious relation between market information and prior experience in an industry, this 
relation might be more complex. For innovation, also user knowledge appears to be relevant 
(Boschma  &  Weterings,  2004;  Shah  &  Tripsas,  2004).  Coming  from  another  industry,  user 
entrepreneurs can accurately indicate the flaws of existing products and the needs of the market. 
Being former consumers, user entrepreneurs can identify niches a new firm can try to fill. Skills 
based on learning-by-using can be extremely useful inputs for new firms (Mole & Elliot, 1987). 
Apart from industry-specific experience, Brüderl et al. (1992) distinguish entrepreneur-
specific  human  capital.  This  type  is  related  to  prior  spells  of  self-employment  in  which  the 
entrepreneur gathered knowledge about administrative duties, management, and entrepreneurship. 
In other words, self-employment experience influences the organisational capital of the new firm. 
Like Becker’s general knowledge, this type of experience is assumed to be industry independent. 
 
A taxonomy of new firm formation types 
Taking a resource-based view, new firms can be seen as new arrangements of partly existing 
resources. The  founders of  the  firms are  responsible  for  entering the resources  into the new 
organizational  structure.  Existing  firms  are  important  sources  of  the  foundings’  inputs.  The 
learning and experience argument show that entrepreneurs transfer part of the parent firms’ skills 
to the founding. Via this indirect route, resources are transferred from parent firms to foundings. 
In some cases, a parent firm also directly allows the transfer of resources. The company, for   4 
example  as  part  of  a  back-to-core  strategy,  decides  to  help  an  employee  to  start  a  new 
independent business. New firms based on resources coming from a parent company are usually 
called spin-off companies. Most spin-off definitions emphasize the indirect resources transfer of 
human  capital  through  job  mobility  (Garvin,  1983;  Klepper,  2001a;  Agarwal  et  al.,  2004; 
Feldmann, 2002). However, some scholars choose a stricter definition in which also the direct 
support is required in order to call a new firm a spin-off (Bernardt et al., 2002; Lindholm, 1994). 
Figure 1 proposes a taxonomy of new firm formation types based on both kinds of resource 
transfer (see also Koster & Van Wissen, 2006). The x-axis denotes indirect resource transfer on 
the individual level, whereas direct support from parent firm to new firm is represented by the y-
axis. 
 
Four main founding types are distinguished in Figure 1: individual start-ups, spin-outs, 
(entrepreneurial)  spin-offs,  and  corporate  spin-offs.  Each  type  is  based  on  the  specific 
combination of the parent firm’s direct and indirect influence. There are no parent firms involved 
in the gestation process of individual start-ups. Individual start-ups are the outcome of personal 
efforts. Neither the gestation process, nor the skills entered by the entrepreneur are influenced by 
a  source  company.  The  firm  will  be  owned  totally  by  the  entrepreneur,  or  the  group  of 
entrepreneurs. Spin-outs (see also Agarwal et al., 2004) are also characterised as stand-alone 
operations of individuals. In terms of Carroll and Hannan (1999), spin-outs are, like individual 
start-ups, assumed to be de novo entries. However, the spin-out entrepreneur bases the new firm 
on skills gathered as an employee. Spin-offs are a blended type in terms of influence. Both the 
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Figure 1: the influence of parent firms and new 
firm formation types   5 
as direct resource transfer occurs. Finally, new venture processes that are characterised by high 
levels  of  firm  influence are  called corporate  spin-off  processes. The  creation  of  offspring  is 
totally orchestrated by the parent company. As part of the strategic business plan, a new firm is 
formed.  Substantive  direct  resource  input  from  the  parent  firm  is  required  for  this.  Capable 
individuals might be assigned as directors of these firms, but are not necessarily previously linked 
to the parent firm. During the gestation phase, the influence of individuals is limited. The parent 
company manages all input resources. 
 
3. Performance in the founding process 
The resource-based view of the firm entails a strong focus on performance. “The value of any 
economic organisation (firm, business, company) derives from and reflects the value to it of 
the resources under its control…” (Lewin & Phelan, 2000, p.61). The quality and availability 
of firm-specific resources in combination with the management of the resources determine the 
performance of new firms (Penrose, 1959). 
Describing performance or success of firms is a thorny issue. Success is a concept with 
several  sides  to  it,  which  makes  it  problematic  to  capture  in  measurable  variables.  Not  the 
identification of success variables as such is a problem, but the interpretation of the variables is. 
Most indicators of success are related to the relative influence of the new firms in the economy. 
Prominent examples include the number of employees (Colombo & Grilli, 2003), employment 
growth (Hoogstra & Van Dijk, 2004; Koch & Strotman, 2004), turnover (Dahlstrand, 1997; Byrd, 
2002), and survival (Nielsen, 2001). Success is a multi-facetted notion, which complicates the 
interpretation of the indicators. What seems to be a success from one point of view, could very 
well be a failure from another point of view. Small firms, for example, have little economic 
impact, but can be highly fulfilling, successful, and profitable for the entrepreneurs involved. The 
link  between  survival  and  success  is  even  more  problematic.  A  discontinued  firm  is  not 
automatically a failure (Headd, 2003; Carroll & Hannan, 1999). Very profitable new firms are 
often sold to interested parties for good money. These firms are discontinued, but hardly failures. 
A special aspect of firm survival is the ability to successfully start a new business, or as 
Van Gelderen (2003, p.1) puts it: “The first success of a firm is its birth.” This side of survival 
has  been  largely  overlooked.  The  reason  is  obvious;  it  is  expensive  and  time  consuming  to 
identify  nascent  entrepreneurs  and  follow  their  founding  efforts  over  time.  Nevertheless, 
regarding the foundings success of nascent entrepreneurs has certain advantages over traditional 
indicators of performance. The completion of the founding process seems purely related to the 
ability of the entrepreneur. It is unlikely that a nascent firm will be sold to another firm, or that   6 
the founding process is terminated for some other positive reason. Reasons, goals, and motives 
for entrepreneurship are diverse, but it can be reasonably expected that every entrepreneur enters 
the founding process with the goal to actually end it. The resulting firms may differ greatly, but 
the wish to get the business up and running is always present. This makes it an indicator of 
success that is, unlike common measures of performance, not influenced by the personal motives 
of the entrepreneurs involved. Founding size, for example, is a function of the ability to start a 
new firm, but also of the entrepreneur’s goals (Colombo et al., 2004). 
The  successful  completion  of  the  founding  process  is  an  interesting  indicator  of 
performance  with  certain  advantages  over  traditional  measures.  However,  the  focus  on  the 
founding  process  precludes  any  information  on  the  economic  impact  of  the  firm  afterwards. 
Finishing the founding process is the firm’s first achievement, but its economic impact is still 
unclear. Traditional measures remain of interest, as they address the economic impact of firms. 
 
Hypotheses 
New firms need to collect resources for production in order to become successful. Three groups 
of  resource  inputs  have  been  identified.  The  first  is  industry-specific  knowledge,  which  is 
transferred to the new firm via the specific skills of the entrepreneur. Spin-offs and spin-outs have 
been defined as new firms that are based on industry-specific resources. The second element is 
direct support (or resource transfer) from parent firm to new firm. Spin-offs benefit from both 
types of resources transfers. In the capacity of well-endowed firms, spin-offs and spin-outs are 
expected  to  outperform  other  foundings.  Finally,  new  firms  can  also  benefit  from  general 
resources that are part of the general skills of the entrepreneur. The three dimensions contribute to 
the performance of the new firm. 
Industry-specific skills are primarily related to the production process of firms. Knowing 
the  ins  and  outs  of  production  entails  an  advantage  over  other  competitors.  Apart  from  the 
technological  benefits,  identifying  profitable  market  niches  is  also  dependent  on  the  specific 
knowledge  of  an  industry  (Shane,  2000).  Extensive  product  knowledge,  related  both  to  the 
production  and  the  identification  of  niches,  is  likely  to  improve  the  founding  success  of 
companies. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Foundings based on industry specific resources have better prospects of concluding 
the  founding  process.  Spin-offs  and  spin-outs  demonstrate  better  pre-entry  performance  than 
other foundings. 
   7 
The second input group is direct support from the parent company. Spin-offs are based on 
direct support and have an easy way to tap into the resources of an existing firm, which helps to 
solve problems in the founding process. Support offers a safety net for the spin-off firm. It is, 
however, not necessarily a blessing. Entrepreneurship is often rooted in ideas of self-realisation 
and  independence  (Bais,  1999;  Van  Uxem  &  Bais,  1996).  Dissatisfaction  with  the  current 
working environment is an important reason to start a new firm (Noorderhaven et al., 1999). 
Entrepreneurs do value the support given by their previous employer, but eventually they could 
value independence even more. The influence of the parent firm can easily turn into a burden for 
entrepreneurs  that  strive  for  independence.  Support  can  also  have  a  negative  influence  on 
performance  as it could  induce less  qualified  entrepreneurs to  take  up  entrepreneurship. The 
parent firm’s support carries the entrepreneurs over the decision threshold. However, once the 
firm is operating, the entrepreneurs could prove to be less suitable for entrepreneurship. The 
resulting  firms  are  less  successful  than  firms  started  by  entrepreneurs  with  the  proper 
entrepreneurial  spirit  and  qualities.  All  in  all,  the  safety  net  function  of  support  helps  the 
entrepreneurs to survive the first phases of development, but it could also encourage ‘pseudo-
entrepreneurs’ to start a firm with little success. However, this will become apparent after the 
successful completion of the founding process. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Support positively affects pre-entry survival. Therefore, spin-offs outperform spin-
outs and individual start-ups in the pre-entry phase. 
 
The third group of resource inputs are the entrepreneur specific skills that encompass 
organisational knowledge. Experience as a manager or as an entrepreneur gives the entrepreneur 
the skills to manage the founding process and the resulting business. A good example of the 
impact  of  management  on  performance  is  described  by  Appold  (2001).  He  shows  that  the 
management of available knowledge and skills directly influences the motivation and satisfaction 
of employees. Continuous mismanagement can lead to a situation in which employees do not 
function well and eventually leave the firm. This will compromise the availability and quality of 
the  resources  for  production. The  founding process  itself  can also  benefit from  trial-an-error 
experience. 
 
Hypothesis  3:  Entrepreneurs  with  superior  organisational  knowledge  have  better  pre-entry 
survival chances than other entrepreneurs. 
   8 
4. The ERC dataset 
The empirical data used in this analysis comes from the Entrepreneurial Research Consortium 
(ERC) dataset. The ERC is an association of leading research institutes with a common interest in 
entrepreneurship. The consortium has its basis in the U.S. and most of its research efforts are 
concentrated here as well. Recently, the ERC methodology and survey have been adopted in other 
countries as well (see for example Van Gelderen et al., 2003 for Dutch case). However, the effort 
is still very much focussed on the U.S. Despite its focus on the U.S. case, the results of ERC 
studies are highly relevant for a better understanding of entrepreneurship in any context. One of 
the  major  accomplishments  of  ERC  is  the  vast  ERC  dataset  that  offers  comprehensive 
information on nascent entrepreneurs; it addresses backgrounds, goals, expectations, resources, 
and success of nascent entrepreneurs. The combined efforts of the participating universities and 
research institutes have resulted in a large and longitudinal panel dataset, which is unprecedented. 
The dataset is freely accessible through the internet.
1 
The goal of the ERC dataset is to identify persons that are in the process of setting up a 
firm  and  follow  them  over  time.  A  research  population  of  830  nascent  entrepreneurs  was 
identified in a screener survey. In order to qualify as nascent entrepreneur, three conditions had to 
be met. First, the respondent expects to own at least part of the new business. Second, there have 
been activities aimed at starting the business in the past 12 months. This condition guarantees 
dormant founding efforts to be left out. Third, the firm is not an infant firm, but is still in the 
founding phase. The last condition relates to the cash-flow of the firm. A firm with a cash-flow 
that covers expenses and the owner-manager salaries for at least three months is considered infant 
and the firm was consequently dropped from the population. After the selection process, the 
founding efforts of the nascent entrepreneurs were followed in four questionnaire waves (from 
1998  to  2003).  The  research  population  of  nascent  entrepreneurs  is  not  a  random  selection. 
Women and ethnic minority groups are over-represented in order to address specific research 
questions of the project’s participants. In order to correct for this bias in the dataset, each analysis 
should be based on weighted versions of the case values. For a comprehensive account of the 
selection process and other particularities of the dataset, the accompanying dataset description by 
Reynolds (2000) should be consulted. 
 
                                                 
1 http://projects.isr.umich.edu/psed/ 
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5. Founding groups 
The first step in the empirical analysis is to establish the founding groups based on indirect 
resource  transfer  and  support  (Figure  1).  Indirect  resource  transfer,  through  job  mobility,  is 
represented  by  two  variables  which  address  the  role  of  the  entrepreneur’s  experience.  The 
variables indicate whether a new firm has been based on the industry experience or the specific 
technological knowledge of the entrepreneurs involved (see Appendix 1). Industry experience and 
technological knowledge relate strongly to the actual production process. As a consequence, both 
variables can be seen as examples of specific learning processes. This respects the general notion 
that specific knowledge is the distinguishing element of spin-offs and spin-outs (Klepper, 2001a). 
Although  the  dominant  spin-off  definitions  relate  the  accumulation  of  specific  knowledge  to 
industry  experience,  this  relationship  is  not  automatic.  Firms  outside  the  industry  can  also 
generate  specific  knowledge.  Client  firms,  for  example,  can  have  a  specific  insight  in  the 
requirements of the market and base a new firm on this experience (Weterings & Koster, 2005; 
Boschma & Weterings, 2004). Likewise, specialised divisions can provide industry knowledge 
that  lies  beyond  the  sector  of  the  company  as  a  whole.  Focussing  on  the  actual  transfer  of 
resources implies that the source of the inputs is less relevant. The assumption that spin-offs (and 
spin-outs) originate from within an industry is relaxed. 
  Direct support from parent firm to new firm is, unfortunately, not conceptualised in the 
ERC dataset. The dataset does not contain information on the nature of support from other firms. 
However, there is information on the legal relation between parent company and the new firm. 
One variable indicates whether a parent company has an ownership share in the new firm, a 
second variable identifies firms that are started as part of an employee’s job assignment. Direct 
resource  transfer is  assumed  when  a  parent  company  is  involved  in  one  of  both  ways.  This 
conceptualisation has the obvious set-back that there is no proof of actual resource transfer from a 
parent company to the new firm. However, it seems plausible that the new firm will receive 
assistance of the firm that is involved, either as the initiator or as future participant. The nature of 
the support remains unclear though. A second point for consideration is the possibility that the 
source firm of the indirect resource transfer is not the same firm that provides the support. A new 
firm  can  therefore  be  based  on  the  industry  experience  gained  in  one  firm  and  the  support 
provided by another firm. This means that a spin-off can have two parents firms. As a result, the 
spin-off  definition  is  not  followed  to  the  letter.  However,  the  theoretical  relations  between 
resource inputs and performance are adequately conceptualised with this method. The focus on 
resources, rather than on the background of the entrepreneurs makes it possible to relax the spin-
off definition slightly without compromising the theoretical issues.   10
  Which founding groups result from this approach? Following the classification in Figure 
1, (individual) start-up are identified as founding efforts that have indirect nor direct resources 
transfer.  Spin-out  entrepreneurs  have  relevant  product  or  technological  knowledge.  However, 
there is no parent firm to fall back on. Finally, spin-offs score a ‘yes’ on both dimensions of 
resource transfer. Table 1 shows the groups’ relative shares. 
 
  Wave I  Wave II  Wave III  Wave IV 
Individual start-ups  38 %  36 %  29 %  37 % 
Spin-outs  49 %  51 %  57 %  50 % 
Spin-offs  13 %  13 %  14 %  13 % 
         
N  557  441  316  327 
 
Table 1: Founding groups in ERC dataset, own calculations (see also Appendix 1) 
   
  The  waves  show  a  very  consistent  division  of  the  founding  groups.  The  questions 
regarding  indirect  resource  transfer  are  repeated  each  wave  and  because  of  this  feature, 
entrepreneurs can shift from group to group. Nevertheless, the largest share of entrepreneurs 
remains in the same founding group throughout the study period. The group sizes in Waves I 
through IV offer a general understanding of the importance of the founding groups. The largest 
group is the spin-out group. This is in line with previous research that suggests most founders to 
have a background in the same industry (Garvin, 1983). Relevant knowledge input is suggested as 
the underlying principle and the above result adds to this idea. The spin-off group is the smallest, 
but still has a considerable size. Even using this strict definition, 13% of all new firms can be 
regarded as spin-offs. This is comparable to Danish results, which are also based on a rather strict 
definition of spin-offs (Dahl & Reichstein, 2005). Although the smallest group, spin-offs are 
hardly a  fringe phenomenon. Especially  when spin-off indeed outperform the other founding 
groups, the economic impact will be larger than the share of firms leads to expect. 
 
6. Completing the founding process 
The first battle has been won when a firm concludes the founding phase. The firm leaves the 
founding phase and can be considered a fully fledged firm. Several demarcation points can be 
used to pinpoint the conclusion of the founding phase; the first sale, hiring staff, registration at the 
Chambers  of  Commerce,  getting  equipment  are  possible  demarcation  points.  None  of  these 
variables, however, applies to all firms in the same way. Many companies never hire employees 
and would therefore be unable to leave the founding phase. The first sale seems a rather solid 
estimator, but some firms are started to facilitate a sale which has been made at the beginning of   11
the founding process. The sale was there before the firm. Finally, founding processes are erratic 
and the founding phases (e.g. business idea, resource collection, registration, production, sale) are 
not followed in this order. In order to avoid these problems, the founding phase is assumed to end 
when the entrepreneur says so. Obviously, this method also has certain limitations. Entrepreneurs 
may be too positive about the founding processes and they can consider the founding processes 
concluded,  while  more  objective  measures  lead  to  a  different  conclusion.  Nevertheless,  this 
method  circumvents  possible  chronological  pitfalls  concerning  the  objective  events  in  the 
founding process. There is also a practical reason. The question is used to track down the status of 
the new firm throughout the ERC dataset. Therefore, adopting the entrepreneurs’ view on the 
status of the process makes comparison across the waves possible. 
 
Descriptive analysis 
Table 2 shows the shares of new operating businesses for each wave. The foundings did not 
conclude  the  founding  phase  previously.  The  number  of  cases  drops  over  time,  because  the 
operating businesses of the previous wave are not taken into account in the new round. On top of 
that,  there  is  the  obvious  problem  of  panel  attrition.  The  founding  groups  are  established 
separately for each wave. The upper row in the table contains the cases of operating businesses. 
In Wave I, as a result of the dataset’s focus on nascent entrepreneurs, all efforts are considered to 
be in the founding phase (‘active start-up’ in ERC terms) and there are no cases of operating 
businesses. In one year (Wave II) about one third of all respondents manage to finish the founding 
process. Spin-outs perform best and reach a success rate of nearly 40%. Individual start-ups are 
clearly lagging behind the spin-offs and spin-outs. In Wave III and IV, the success rates drop 
considerably, especially in the start-up and spin-out group. The chances of reaching the end of the 
founding  process  drop  when  time  is  progressing.  A  thorough  pre-entry  process  is  usually 
considered  a  positive  feature,  because  it  is  related  with  better  post-entry  performance  (Van 
Gelderen, 1999). A serious and capable entrepreneur needs some time to organise the founding 
successfully. Within the founding process itself, time seems to be an enemy rather than a friend. 
The longer the founding process takes, the slimmer chances of ending the process become. A 
study using the Dutch version of the ERC dataset shows the same trend (Van Gelderen et al., 
2003). The results are in line with the hypothesis that with the passing of time between initiation 
and full functioning, it is increasingly difficult to adjust the founding process to all changes in the 
environment (Hannan & Freeman, 1989). The entrepreneur has to act upon the environmental 
conditions as quickly as possible. Spin-offs seem to be the exception to this rule and the pre-entry 
success rate even peaks in wave IV. This result hints at the safety net function of the support   12
received. Even when the founding process proves to be complicated, the support of a parent firm 
ensures a successful conclusion. 
 
  Individual start-ups  Spin-outs  Spin-offs 
  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV 
Operating firm    24  12  15    38  25  16    32  27  47 
Not operating  100  76  88  85  100  62  75  84  100  68  73  53 
                         
N  211  157  67  60  274  224  107  69  71  60  22  17 
 
Table 2: Status of foundings (in percentages), using founding groups defined separately for each wave. 
Own calculation based on ERC dataset 
   
The method used in Table 2 allows entrepreneurs to shift groups, because the founding 
groups are redefined in each wave. This means, that the analyses are necessarily cross sectional. 
In  order  to  exploit  the  longitudinal  nature  of  the  data  fully,  the  founding  groups  should  be 
established in the first wave and than followed over time. In order to do so, a group of 249 loyal 
respondents was identified. These respondents participated in each of the waves and could be 
classified in one of the founding groups in the first wave. The group was followed over time and 
their founding success is presented in Table 3. Again, the expected order of the founding groups 
is confirmed. At the end of the study period, 59% of all spin-offs are operating businesses, and 
88% of all spin-off firms reached the operating phase in one of the waves. The gap between the 
shares shows that some firms were started and discontinued within the study period. These firms 
reached the ‘operating business’ phase at one point, but are no longer operating in the last wave. 
The success shares for spin-outs and individual start-ups are considerably lower. However, spin-
off firms seem to have higher mortality rates after the conclusion of the founding process. The 
gap between the share of firms that have reached the operating business phase and the share of 
firms that are still operating at the end of the research period is relatively large for spin-offs. 
Individual start-ups and spin-out more often remain in operation. This is in line with the argument 
that support is only profitable up to a point (Weterings & Koster, 2005). Firms need to stand on 
their  own  feet  in  order  to  become  feasible  businesses.  However,  there  is  an  alternative 
explanation. Relatively many spin-offs are sold to others (20% of all operating spin-offs, 16% for 
individual  start-ups  and  4%  for  spin-outs).  It  seems  that  the  discontinuation  of  spin-offs  is 
frequently based on positive reasons. Unfortunately, the number of cases is too small to draw any 
substantive conclusions in this matter. Nevertheless, the large share of drop-outs is not necessarily 
a  negative  point.  This  only  confirms  the  idea  that  firm  survival  is  multi-interpretable  as  a 
performance indicator.   13
 
  Operating at end of period  Reached operating phase 
Individual start-up (n=85)  34 %  49 % 
Spin-out (n=130)  51 %  65 % 
Spin-off (n=34)  59 %  88 % 
 
Table 3: pre-entry success rates of loyal respondents (N=249) 
 
Multivariate analysis 
The descriptive statistics suggest that spin-offs and spin-outs outperform individual start-ups, 
capitalising on experience and the support from parent companies. In this section, the effect of 
specific skills and support on the successful completion of the founding process is assessed while 
controlling for other experience variables, including organisational knowledge and skills. The 
definitions  of  spin-offs  and  spin-outs  emphasize  the  role  of  specialised  knowledge  of  the 
production  process.  However,  also  general  knowledge  helps  entrepreneurs  to  start  their  firm 
(Helfat & Lieberman, 2002). Next to that, there may be additional industry-specific knowledge, 
not captured in the definitions. Especially the role of market knowledge and network activities is 
not represented in the operationalisation used. These possible intervening effects are corrected for 
in the binominal regressions, presented in tables 4 and 5. 
The influence of specific knowledge on the completion of the founding process is tested 
in six models. Models A, B1, and B2 (Table 4) use all eligible founding efforts in the dataset, 
whereas models C, D1, and D2 (Table 5) apply only to solo entrepreneurs. The variables included 
in the models represent the general knowledge, specific knowledge, and assets available to the 
entrepreneur. The dependent variable in all models is the dummy variable whether the founding 
effort was completed successfully in at least one of the four waves. 
The dimension of general knowledge is captured by several indicators of experience. The 
most obvious variables are the age (ln) and educational attainment of the entrepreneurs (lnage & 
education). Both are expected to raise the chances of pre-entry success. General experience can 
also be understood in terms of management and entrepreneurship experience. These factors are 
especially relevant for the foundation process of new firms, because the entrepreneur picks up 
knowledge  related  to  the  organisation  of  businesses.  The  number  of  years  employed  in  a 
management function (ln years employed as administrator) and coming from self-employment 
(self-employed) measure this effect. For solo entrepreneurs (Models C and D), the assistance in 
other founding efforts is also included (solo: helped other founding). All variables are supposed to 
positively influence the successful conclusion of the founding process.   14
The second dimension in the models is specific knowledge, which is measured in two 
ways.  First,  the  variables  used  to  define  the  founding  groups  represent  specific  knowledge 
(Appendix  2).  These  variables  focus  on  the  production  side  of  specific  knowledge.  The 
classification variables are used in three ways. In  models A and C, the founding groups are 
entered as nominal variables (founding group). In models B1 and D1, the variables used for the 
founding group classification are entered (Specific knowledge & support). Finally, in model B2 
and D2, the interaction term between specific knowledge and support is added. The interaction 
term represents the spin-off group, including foundings based on specific product knowledge and 
support. Second, there is a dimension of specific knowledge not directly related to production. 
This  side is  not captured  in  the  product  knowledge  used  to identify  spin-outs  and  spin-offs. 
Unfortunately,  these additional  skills  as  such are  not  present  in the dataset,  but  the  industry 
experience of solo entrepreneurs is. Learning effects that are not captured by the product related 
experience are captured by this variable, which appears in models C and D. 
The final part of the models consists of the control variables. The variables refer to the 
structure of the founding and the assets available to it. Firstly, group efforts (Founding team) are 
generally understood to have higher chances of success (see for example Colombo & Grilli, 
2003). In a group founding, the chances of complementing skills is higher which makes it easier 
to manage all sides of the foundation process successfully (Lazear, 2003). This variable is only 
included in models A and B, as the other models apply to solo entrepreneurs only. Secondly, 
having a job while starting up could have an effect as well (hybrid founding). On then one hand, 
it can provide the entrepreneur with an easy access to resources. On the other hand, it can indicate 
a lack of commitment to the foundation process. A lack of time or commitment has been shown 
to negatively affect performance (Van Uxem & Bais, 1996). Thirdly, the financial position of the 
entrepreneurs  is  important  as  well  (Income).  Setbacks  in  the  founding  process  are  easier  to 
overcome when the financial position of the entrepreneur is good.   15
 
  Model A    Model B1    Model B2   
General knowledge:           
Ln age entrepreneur  0.13 (0.45)  0.22 (0.45)  0.21 (0.46)  
Education:       
Low  -0.96 (0.74)†  -0.81 (0.75)  -0.78 (0.75) 
Middle  -1.13 (0.68)*  -1.06 (0.68)†  -1.02 (0.68)† 
High (ref)  --  --  -- 
       
Ln years employed as administrator  -0.02 (0.03)  -0.02 (0.03)  -0.23 (0.03) 
Self-employed (d)  1.55 (0.43)**  1.53 (0.42)**  1.72 (0.44)** 
       
Specific skills:       
Founding group:       
Individual start-up  -2.02 (0.72)**     
Spin-out  -1.28 (0.70)*     
Spin-off (ref)  --     
       
Specific knowledge (d)    0.95 (0.38)**  0.42 (0.42) 
Support (d)    0.05 (0.44)  -1.55 (0.75)** 
Support x specific knowledge      0.89 (1.05)** 
       
Assets / control:       
Income:       
Low  -0.92 (1.4)  -0.72 (1.32)  -1.03 (1.40) 
Middle  0.44 (0.67)  0.43 (0.65)  0.47 (0.67) 
High (ref)  --  --  -- 
       
Hybrid founding (d)  -0.20 (0.45)  -0.21 (0.45)  -0.29 (0.47) 
Founding team (d)  0.72 (0.41)*  0.70 (0.40)*  0.73 (0.41)* 
Gender (d, male = 1)  0.28 (0.39)  0.45 (0.38)  0.12 (0.40) 
Heckman’s Lambda  -1.62 (0.92)*  -1.79 (0.89)*  -1.37 (0.93) 
       
Intercept  1.07 (5.34)  -1.96 (5.24)  -1.81 (5.30) 
Nagelkerke R
2  0.33  0.31  0.36  
-2 loglikelihood 0-model  240.93   240.93   240.93  
-2 loglikelihood  190.23   194.11   185.59  
N  182   182   182  
Table 4: multivariate estimates of founding success for all foundings. 
binary logistic regression, dep. variable – founding success (1= founding process successfully completed), 
(d) – dummy variable, (ref) – reference group, SE-values in parentheses.  
† - significant at 10% level (one-sided confidence intervals), * - 5% level, ** - 1% level 
 
Table 4 shows three specifications of the binary logistic regressions used to assess the 
effect of previous experiences and support on pre-entry success. Models A and B use the whole 
subset of loyal respondents, group foundings inclusive. The overall performance of the models is 
good.  The  R-square  scores  are  reasonable  and  the  individual  influence  of  the  variables  is 
consistent in all specifications of the models.    16
Following the order of presentation in the table, we first turn to the general knowledge 
indicators. The influence of these indicators is rather weak. General learning types exert little 
influence  on  the  founding  success.  Age  does  not  play  a  role  and  also  administrative  or 
supervisory experience has no significant influence. The only beneficiary general background for 
self-employment  is  self-employment.  This  result  is  in  accordance  with  literature  on  habitual 
entrepreneurship which regards entrepreneurship as a trial-and-error process with a higher chance 
of  success  after  prior  founding  attempts  (Alsos  &  Kolvereid,  1998).  The  entrepreneur  gains 
organisational  knowledge  and  deploys  this  in  consecutive  founding  attempts.  Hypothesis  3, 
regarding the positive influence of organisational skills, is therefore accepted. It should be borne 
in mind though, that the organisational skills are measured indirectly and that the result only 
applies to self-employment. Management experience has no influence. Education, finally, shows 
an unexpected pattern. Higher education leads to better founding chances compared to medium 
levels of education. This is in line with the expectations, as the general knowledge is assumed to 
be better for the higher educated. They can use this knowledge in the founding process. However, 
contrary to this argument, there is no statistically significant difference between the entrepreneurs 
with the highest and lowest education levels. Perhaps the group of poorly educated entrepreneurs  
has few alternatives to self-employment. The chances of finding a job as an employee are lower, 
which forces these entrepreneurs to finish the founding process. 
The specific knowledge indicators show interesting results. In Model A, spin-offs clearly 
outperform the other foundings, but the difference between spin-outs and individual start-ups (not 
displayed)  is  not  significant.  The  mixture  of  support  and  experience  (i.e.  spin-off)  appears 
especially successful. This idea is confirmed in Model B1 and B2. Without the interaction term 
(B1), experience boosts the pre-entry success of firms. This is in line with Hypothesis 1; Product 
specific knowledge does lead to a smoother founding process. However, when the interaction 
term is added (B2), the single effects of experience and support diminish and the combination of 
support and product specific knowledge overpowers the other variables. Specific knowledge still 
has a positive sign, but is not significant. Support even contributes negatively to the founding 
success, which contradicts Hypothesis 2. The result is in line though  with a negative effect of 
support on innovative output, as found by Weterings and Koster (2005). Apparently, receiving 
support as such does not help the new firm. However, the combination of product knowledge and 
support ensures a promising outcome of the founding process.  
The control variables behave as expected. Entrepreneurs with low incomes have slimmer 
chances of surviving the founding phase. The income variable improves the models considerably 
in terms of R-square scores. It is therefore an important variable for explaining founding success.   17
Group efforts have higher chances of success. The sum of the entrepreneurs’ knowledge and 
assets  ensures  better  possibilities.  Hybrid  entrepreneurs  have  somewhat  lower  chances  of 
finishing  the  founding  process.  This  confirms  the  idea  that  the  entrepreneur  should  be  fully 
committed to the task in order to actually start the new firm. It does not necessarily mean that 
these entrepreneurs are less suited for the job. They simply have the possibility of returning to 
their previous employment when things go astray in the founding process. In contrast to the 
entrepreneurs with low educational attainment, they are not forced to end the founding process as 
the result of a lack of alternatives. 
Models C  and D  (Table 5)  use  the  subsample  of  solo entrepreneurs. The results  are 
comparable to models A and B with a notable exception in the specific knowledge variables. In 
line with the first models, the impact of specific knowledge is significantly positive (Klepper, 
2001a;  Agarwal  et  al.,  2004).  Support  is  again  negatively  related  to  founding  success.  The 
accumulated effect of the main variables and the interaction variables is lower for supported 
foundings compared to unsupported foundings. However, in contrast to the case of all foundings 
(including group foundings), solo entrepreneurs do benefit from the combinatory effect of support 
and specific knowledge. The support of a parent firm may have a comparable positive effect as 
working in a team. In a team, the skills of the entrepreneurs are combined and problems can be 
faced together. For solo-entrepreneurs, the extra inputs in the founding process may be attracted 
from the parent company. It would explain the fact that support has no additional positive effect 
for team starts. A team of entrepreneurs is proficient. Additional help is not necessary. For solo-
entrepreneurs the support (in combination with specific knowledge) seems more important.  
  Model C and D also include an additional variable which measures the industry 
experience of the entrepreneurs. This variable captures residual effects of industry experience. 
The industry experience variable has a significant positive influence on the conclusion of the 
founding process. Entrepreneurs take knowledge and skills, other than related to the product, 
from their previous employer to the new firm. This residual influence of industry experience 
involves the recognition of market opportunities (Shane, 2000; Shane, 2005) and the social status 
of the entrepreneur within the sector (Van Sorenson, 2004; Wissen, 2004). The entrepreneur can 
rely on reputation and an extensive network of contacts to effectively conclude the founding 
process.   18
 
  Model C    Model D1    Model D2   
General knowledge:             
Ln age entrepreneur  -0.82 (0.68)  -0.49 (0.70)   -0.57 (0.74)  
Education:       
Low  -1.16 (1.12)  -0.90 (1.14)  -1.00 (1.20) 
Middle  -1.70 (1.02)*  -1.65 (1.00)*  -1.91 (1.08)* 
High (ref)  --  --  -- 
       
Ln years employed as administrator  -0.01 (0.05)  0.00 (0.05)  0.00 (0.05) 
Self-employed (d)  1.27 (0.77)*  1.31 (0.75)*  1.54 (0.81)* 
Solo: helped other founding (d)  -0.45 (0.66)  -0.30 (0.64)  -0.91 (0.76) 
       
Specific skills:       
Founding group:       
Individual start-up  -2.37 (1.24)*     
Spin-out  -1.20 (1.13)     
Spin-off (ref)  --     
       
Specific knowledge (d)    1.36 (0.78)*  0.76 (0.85) 
Support (d)    -0.65 (0.74)  -3.82 (1.69)* 
Support x specific knowledge      5.12 (2.09)** 
       
Solo: industry experience (d)  1.84 (0.89)**  1.61 (0.91)*  1.26 (1.00) 
       
Controls / assets:       
Income:       
Low  -3.68 (2.44)†  -2.52 (2.24)  -4.53 (2.62)* 
Middle  -0.85 (1.38)  0.39 (1.26)  -0.19 (0.76) 
High (ref)  --  --  -- 
       
Hybrid founding (d)  -1.97 (0.86)*  -1.81 (0.84)*  -2.51 (1.00)** 
Gender (d, male = 1)  0.14 (0.63)  0.39 (0.61)  0.58 (0.66) 
Heckman’s Lambda  -0.95 (1.47)  -1.56 (1.40)  -0.44 (1.53) 
       
Intercept  11.80 (8.33)†  5.85 (8.00)  8.12 (8.58)  
Nagelkerke R
2  0.50  0.50  0.57  
-2 loglikelihood 0-model  123.37  123.37  123.37  
-2 loglikelihood  80.96   81.47   73.19  
N  95   95   95  
Table 5: multivariate estimates of founding success for solo entrepreneurs. 
binary logistic regression, dep. variable – founding success (1= founding process successfully 
completed), (d) – dummy variable, (ref) – reference group, SE-values in parentheses.  
† - significant at 10% level (one-sided confidence intervals), * - 5% level, ** - 1% level 
 
Turning to the other variables, it becomes clear that very little has changed compared to 
the previous models. The results seem pretty robust. The R-square values for the subsample are 
higher  than  before,  suggesting  a  good  explanation  of  the  variance  in  the  models.  The  most 
important  difference  is  the  consistently  negative  influence  of  hybrid  foundings.  For  solo 
entrepreneurs,  hybrid  foundings  have  significantly  higher  pre-entry  failure  rates  than  other   19
foundings. The easy solution of going back to employment seems more pregnant than in the 
context of group starts. Group dynamics could force entrepreneurs to continue with a difficult 
founding process, rather than returning to employment. 
In conclusion, the founding success of firms can be explained rather well on the basis of 
the input resources. Hypothesis 1 is confirmed. Product specific knowledge enhances pre-entry 
performance. Hypothesis 2 is partly confirmed. Support does have a positive influence, but only 
in  combination  with  product  knowledge.  Support  as  such  has  no  positive  influence  on  the 
founding success. Hypothesis 3 is also partly confirmed. Indeed, organisational knowledge seems 
to be important. However, this is only true for organisational knowledge gained in the context of 
self-employment.  Management  experience  as  an  employee,  also  leading  to  organisational 
knowledge, does not increase founding success. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Spin-offs  are  considered  successful  founding  efforts.  The  combination  of  relevant  industry 
specific knowledge and skills concerning the production process and direct support from a parent 
company make these firms stand out from the rest. Several studies have found empirical evidence 
to back this statement up. Most of these studies define spin-offs on the basis of the previous 
employment  positions  of  the  entrepreneurs.  This  method  disregards  the  process  of  resource 
transfer that theoretically  explains the  differences  in  performance with  other  foundings. This 
paper  offers  an  empirical  analysis  based  on  the  actual resource  transfer  from  parent  firm  to 
founding. 
  Three founding groups have been defined based on the product specific knowledge of the 
founders and the influence of a third party. Spin-off entrepreneurs have product knowledge and 
the support, spin-outs rely on product knowledge, whereas individual start-up have to do without 
support  or  specific  product  knowledge.  Spin-outs  form  the  largest  group  and  spin-offs  are 
relatively rare. This is in line with previous findings that most entrepreneurs base their business 
ideas on experiences they have had with the product. 
  The founding success of the three founding groups is compared and explained. Success is 
conceptualised as the completion of the founding process. This is a rather atypical measure, but it 
has  certain  advantages  over  survival  after  foundation  which  overlooks  positive  reasons  for 
discontinuation. Pre-entry survival links to failure more directly. 
  The results are encouraging and in line with what could be expected from the theoretical 
ideas on resource availability; well-endowed firms have good chances of successfully completing 
the founding process. Expectations hold in the case of spin-offs, but for spin-outs the story is not   20
so obvious. Although the descriptive statistics do suggest that spin-outs have a small edge over 
individual start-up, the differences are mostly small and not statistical significant. The positive 
role of product specific resources inputs on pre-entry survival is therefore not confirmed. The 
same conclusion applies to support; Support as such is not a recipe for pre-entry survival either. 
Support without any product feeling even results in lower founding chances. This adds to the idea 
that support is not a panacea for all entrepreneurial problems. If both elements are combined 
though, the prospects of the new firm are extremely good. It is the combination of support and 
product knowledge that accounts for the good reputation of spin-offs. 
  Additional  results  which  relate  less  directly  to  spin-offs  include  positive  effects  of 
previous  entrepreneurial  experience  and  a  background  in  the  same  industry.  The  first  effect 
stresses the role of organisational skills in the founding process. The analysis makes clear that 
skills  from  self-employment  are  more  important  than  managerial  skill  developed in  previous 
supervising  functions.  Perhaps  in  later  stages  of  development,  especially  in  growing  firms, 
managerial experience becomes more valuable. The second effect is the positive impact of having 
an industry background. This indicator lies outside the theoretical framework of resources and 
stresses the career background of the entrepreneur. Its positive influence indicates that product 
related knowledge is not the only factor explaining the success of firms. There are other types of 
resources that positively contribute to pre-entry survival. Knowledge related to the structure and 
market of the industry is a likely candidate. The entrepreneurs use their network and reputation in 
the founding process. 
  Resources  and  skills  theoretically  explain  the  success  of  new  firms.  However,  the 
translation into empirical testing is still difficult. This study has shown that it is possible and the 
results  are  promising.  Nevertheless,  measuring  resource  inputs  is  tricky  and  needs  further 
refinement. In order to advance the analysis, the relationship between industry experience and the 
resulting skills of the entrepreneurs deserves extra attention. The head-start of spin-offs over other 




Agarwal R., R. Echambadi, A.M. Franco & MB. Sarkar (2004). Knowledge transfer through 
inheritance: spin-out generation, development and survival. The Acadamy of 
Management Journal 47 (4) p. 501-522 
Aldrich H.E. (1999). Organizations evolving. Sage, London 
Alsos G.A. & L. Kolvereid (1998). The business gestation process of novice, serial, and parallel 
business founders. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice p. 101-114 
Appold S.J. (2001). The control of high-skill labor and entrepreneurship in the early US 
semiconductor industry. Environment and Planning A 33 p. 2133-2160 
Bais J. (1999). Startende ondernemers 1998. Economisch Instituut voor het Midden- en 
kleinbedrijf, Zoetermeer 
Barney J. (1991). Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of management 
17 (1) p. 99-120 
Becker G.S. (1964). Human Capital. Columbia University Press, New York 
Bernardt Y., R. Kerste & J. Meijaard (2002). Spin-off startups in the Netherlands: at first glance. 
E.I.M., Zoetermeer 
Boschma R.A. & A.B.R. Weterings (2004). The effect of regional differences on the performance 
of software firms in the Netherlands. University of Utrecht, Utrecht 
Brüderl J., P. Preisendörfer & R. Ziegler (1992). Survival chances of newly founded business 
organizations. American Sociological Review 57 (2) p. 227-242 
Byrd C.A. (2002). Profile of spin-off firms in the biotechnology sector: Results from the 
biotechnology use and development survey - 1999. Statistics Canada, Canada 
Carroll G.R. & M.T. Hannan (1999). The demography of corporations and industries. Princeton 
University Press, Princeton 
Colombo M.G., M. Delmastro & L. Grilli (2004). Entrepreneurs' human capital and the start-up 
size of new technology-based firms. International journal of industrial organization 22 p. 
1183-1211 
Colombo M.G. & L. Grilli (2003). Does founders' human capital affect the growth of new 
technology-based firms? a competence-based perspective.  Milan 
Daft R. (1983). Organization theory and design. West, New York 
Dahl M.S. & T. Reichstein (2005). Are you experienced? Prior experience and the survival of 
new organizations. Danish Research Unit for Industrial Dynamics, Aalborg 
Dahlstrand A.L. (1997). Growth and inventiveness in technology-based spin-off firms. Research 
Policy 26 p. 331-344 
Eckhardt J.T. & S.A. Shane (2003). Opportunities and entrepreneurship. Journal of management 
29 (3) p. 333-349 
Eriksson T. & J.M. Kuhn (2004). Firm spin-offs in Denmark 1981-2000 - patterns of entry and 
exit. Department of Economics, Aarhus School of Business, Aarhus 
Feldmann M.P. (2002). The locational dynamics of the U.S. biotech industry: knowledge 
externalities and the anchor hypothesis. TEG-conference, Groningen 
Garvin D.A. (1983). Spin-offs and the new firm formation process. California Management 
Review 25 (2) p. 3-20 
Gelderen M.v. (1999). Ontluikend ondernemerschap. EIM, Zoetermeer 
Gelderen M.v., A.R. Thurik & N. Bosma (2003). Success and risk factors in the pre-startup 
phase. EIM, Zoetermeer 
Hannan M.T. & J. Freeman (1989). Organizational ecology. Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge   22
Headd B. (2003). Redefining business success: distinguishing between closure and failure. Small 
Business Economics 21 p. 51-61 
Helfat C.E. & M.B. Lieberman (2002). The birth of capabilities: market entry and the importance 
of pre-history. Industrial and Corporate Change 11 (4) p. 725-760 
Hoogstra G.J. & J.v. Dijk (2004). Explaining firm employment growth: does location matter? 
Small Business Economics 22 p. 179-192 
Klepper S.J. (2001a). Employee startups in high-tech industries. Industrial and Corporate Change 
10 (3) p. 639-674 
Klepper S.J. (2001b). The evolution of the U.S. automobile industry and Detroit as its capital. 
Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, DRUID Academy Winter 2002 PhD Conference 
Koch A. & H. Strotman (2004). The impact of regional and functional intergration on the post-
entry performance of knowledge intensive business service firms. Presented at the ERSA 
conference 2004, Porto 
Koster S. & L.J.G.v. Wissen (2006). Inherited resources and company support as a basis for new 
firm formation. A taxonomy of founding types: start-ups, spin-outs, and spin-offs. In: 
Karlsson C., B. Johansson & R. Stough. Entrepreneurship and Dynamics in a 
Knowledge-Economy. Routledge, 
Lazear E.P. (2003). Entrepreneurship. IZA, Bonn 
Lewin P. & S.E. Phelan (2000). An Austrian theory of the firm. Review of Austrian Economics 13 
(1) p. 59-79 
Lindholm A. (1994). The economics of technology-related ownership changes. A study of 
innovativeness and growth through acquisitions and spin-off. Chalmers University of 
Technology, Gothenburg 
Mole V. & D. Elliot (1987). Enterprising innovation. An alternative approach. Frances Pinter 
Publishers, London 
Nielsen P.B. (2001). Statistics on new entreprises, the entrepreneurs and the survival of the start-
ups. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
Noorderhaven N.G., A.R.M. Wennekers, G. Hofstede, A.R. Thurik & R.E. Wildeman (1999). 
self-employment out of dissatisfaction: an international study. IRIC / EIM, 
Tilburg/Zoetermeer 
Pen C.J. (2002). Wat beweegt bedrijven; besluitvormingprocessen bij verplaatste bedrijven. 
Rijkuniversiteit Groningen, Groningen 
Penrose E.T. (1959). The theory of the growth of the firm. Blackwell, Oxford 
Schutjens V.A.J.M. & E. Wever (2000). Determinants of new firm success. Papers in Regional 
Science 79 p. 135-159 
Shah S. & M. Tripsas (2004). When do user-innovators start firms? Towards a theory of user 
entrepreneurship. University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign 
Shane S.A. (2000). Prior knowledge and the discovery of entrepreneurial opportunities. 
Organization science 11 (4) p. 448-469 
Shane S.A. (2005). A general theory of entrepreneurship. The individual-opportunity nexus. 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, Northampton 
Stam E. (2003). Why butterflies don't leave. Locational evolution of evolving enterprises. 
University of Utrecht, Utrecht 
Storey D.J. (1994). Understanding the small business sector. Routledge, London 
Uxem F.W.v. & J. Bais (1996). Het starten van een eigen bedrijf: ervaringen van 2000 starters. 
EIM, Zoetermeer 
Weterings A.B.R. & S. Koster (2005). Inheriting knowledge and sustaining relationships: What 
stimulates the innovative performance of software firms in the Netherlands? DRUID 
Academy Winter 2005 PhD conference, Aalborg 
 
   23
Appendix 1. Establishing founding groups 
 
The following variables have been used to establish the founding groups: 
 
1. Indirect resource transfer through the entrepreneur (Wave I – IV): 
 
Qa5b – My experience in a particular industry or market led to my business idea,  
1 = yes, 2 = no 
 
Qa5h – My knowledge or expertise with a specific technology led to my business idea, 
1 = yes, 2 = no 
 
Condensed form of the variables (own calculation): 
Exp – Business is based on experience 
1 = yes, if Qa5b = 1 or Qa5h = 1 
0 = no, if Qa5b = 2 and Qa5h = 2 
 
These questions are asked in each of the questionnaire waves. The names of the variables in wave 
2 are Ra5b and Ra5h, in wave 3 Sa5b and Sa5h, and in wave 4 Ta5b and Ta5h. 
 
2. Direct resource transfer from existing firm (Wave I only): 
 
Autonsu - Autonomous start-up scale,  
1 = no outside influence, 2 = <50% No Person, independent start-up, 3 = <50% No Person, 
Franchise MLM, 4 = <50% No Person, business sponsor, 5 = >51% No Person own, 6 = 
100% No Person own 
 
Q101 – Is this business start-up effort on your own, as part of your current job, or as a mixture of 
both?  
1 = start-up of own, 2 = start-up for employer, 3 = mixture of both 
 
Condensed form of the variables (own calculation): 
Infl – Business has experienced outside influence 
1 = yes, if Autonsu ￿ 1 or q101 ￿ 1 
0 = no, if Autonsu = 1 and q101 = 1 
 
 
3. Defining the founding groups (own calculation): 
 
Groups – Classification of the founding efforts 
1 = Individual start-up, if exp = 0 
2 = Spin-out, if exp = 1 and infl = 0 
3 = Spin-off, if exp = 1 and infl = 1 
   24











Itrwage (ln) – Respondent Age 




Q341 – For how many years, if any, did you have managerial, supervisory, or administrative 
responsibilities? 
Q332 (dummy) – Are you a small-business owner or self-employed? 
Q200sk (dummy) – Have you helped starting up any other businesses? (solo entrepreneurs only, 
based on Q200)  
 
Founding groups / specific knowledge: 
 
Groups – Founding groups 
Infl (dummy) – Does the business experience any outside influence (see appendix 4.2)? 
Exp (dummy) – Is the business based on previous experience (see appendix 4.2)? 
Q199sk (dummy) – Have you had work experience in this business? – the one where the new 
business will compete. (solo entrepreneurs only, based on q199) 
 
Controls / assets:: 
 
Q116 (dummy) – Has a start-up team been organized? 
Q331 (dummy) – Are you working for others for pay? 
USHHINC3 – Respondent annual HH Income – 3 groups 